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dEARNINGS INEQUALITY  IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES OF CENTRAL




This paper documents trends in  earnings distribution during the transition in Central
Europe, and examines changes in relative wages that have underlined the rise in earnings
inequality. The paper finds that the widening of earnings distribution was concentrated in
the early phase of transition, and the trend towards greater inequality in most countries
tapered off during the late 1990s. This suggests that a new equilibrium has been reached,
or at least approached.  This equilibrium is characterized by high but not exorbitant
earnings  dispersion.  In  most  transitional  economies  of  Central  Europe  earnings
inequality is  in  the upper  part of  the OECD range, rarely beyond  that range.  The
widening of earnings distribution has occurred at its both ends.  The relative position of
low-paid workers has deteriorated while the position of top paid workers has improved.
At the same time the incidence of both low- and high-pay has considerably increased.
High earnings dispersion is particularly pronounced in the private  sector, which  is a
primary source of both low- and high-paying jobs.  The main observable factor behind
the increase in  earnings inequality during the transition has been the increase in the
premium to  university  education.  Education is  currently the  single most  important
variable  explaining  the  attained  level  of  inequality,  whereas  inter-industry  wage
differentials are second in importance. The contribution of other factors, such as gender,
labor market experience, location, is small or insignificant.
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iiiEarnings Inequality In Transition Economies of Central Europe
Trends and Patterns During the 1990s
INTRODUCTION
Earnings inequality was traditionally low under central planning.  Economic transition
has brought about a considerable increase in inequality, which was concentrated over just a
few years.  Already in early  1990s, when the transition  was at its  early stage, earnings
inequality in most historically planned economies of Central Europe (CE) reached the range
characteristic  of  mature  market  economies  of  Western  Europe  (Rutkowski,  1  996b).
Interestingly, the increase in  earnings dispersion was not  directly related to  the pace of
economic reforms.  Earnings dispersion has increased both in countries which adopted fast
and decisive market oriented reforms, such as the Czech Republic or Poland, and in countries
where reforms were slow and faltering, such as Bulgaria or Romania.  It seems that the
decentralization  of the wage setting has had a stronger impact on the wage structure than the
speed of privatization and other related reforms.  Although the development of the private
sector undoubtedly has spearheaded the process of rising earnings dispersion, the forces of
supply and demand compelled the public sector to adjust its wage setting practices, too.
Has the trend toward greater earnings inequality, that  emerged so forcefully at the
outset of the transition, continued along with the development of market institutions?  Or,
after a few years of intensive adjustment the earnings structure reached a new equilibrium
and the trend toward  greater inequality has tapered out?  Do earnings differentials keep
rising, or have they stabilized?  This paper aims to answers these questions by documenting
changes in the earnings distribution in selected CE countries during the 1990s, focusing on
the second half of the decade, i.e. at the later phase of the transition.  It also attempts to
examine some of the factors underlying the changes in the earnings structure.
The paper updates the results of numerous earlier papers on the earnings structure in
transition economies of Eastern and Central Europe (see for example Rutkowski, 1996b, and
Newell and Reilly, 1997 for the analysis of the earnings structure at an early stage of the
transition).  It does not address, in a systematic manner, conceptual issues relating to the
changes in the earnings structure in the wake of economic transition, as these have been
Itreated quite extensively in other papers.  For instance, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992),
Flanagan (1993), Munich, et al. (1999), and Rutkowski (1994) discuss wage determination in
the CE countries under central planning, on the eve of economic transition.  A conceptual
framework for the analysis of the impact of transition on the earnings structure is presented
in Orazem and  Vodopivec (1997), and possible  explanations for the changes in relative
wages are provided in Rutkowski (1  996a).  Thus,  the scope of this paper is limited lo an
empirical  analysis of  the recent  evidence on  trends  in  earnings distribution in  the  CE
countries.
The study focuses on the earnings distribution of full-time wage and salary workers.'
This approach is in part dictated by the scope of the employer based earning surveys (wVhich
exclude the self-employed and part-time workers), but also by an intention to compare likes
with likes, i.e. to control for some exogenous factors affecting earnings level. 2 Also in line
with the received tradition, this study does not include the unemployed in the analysis of the
earnings distribution.  It is sometimes argued that the unemployed should be included (with
their earnings equal zero) in order to measure the broader notion of labor market inequality
(including the inequality in access to jobs), and to incorporate in the analysis the trade-off
between wage dispersion and unemployment.  Although we see the rationale behind this
idea, we think that in practice such a  comprehensive measure of labor market inequality
would conceal  more that  it  would reveal,  as  it would  merge two  separate - although
admittedly related - phenomena, rendering the interpretation of such a  measure difficult.
Thus, we stick to the traditional approach, by focusing on a single aspect of labor market
inequality - inequality of earnings.
The analysis of the earnings distribution is based on employer based surveys. Earnings
are defined as gross monthly earnings and salaries of full time employees.  The non-cash
elements of worker remuneration are left out of the analysis.  A detailed description of the
surveys is provided in Rutkowski (1996b).  The analysis of wage determination, and the
analysis of links between the earnings distribution and poverty is based on household based
I  This is consistent with other intemational comparisons of earnings distribution;  see for example OECD
(1996).
2  For example, eamings of the employees and the self-employed are determined according to different
rules.
2surveys, such as the Labor Force Survey or LSMS type surveys.  Here earnings are defined
as net (take-home) monthly earnings.
The country coverage is confined to transition economies of Central Europe including
the Baltic states (but excluding other FSU countries). In Section I, which examines trends in
the earnings distribution, we cover all transitional Central European economies for which
data are available.3 In Section II, which focuses on the wage determination, we use a narrow
sample of countries consisting of Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia and Poland.  This sample
was determined by the availability of micro data sets containing information on earnings.
We supplement the analysis of wage  determination by data on the  Czech Republic and
Latvia, which come from recently produced papers by Munich, et al. (1999) and Chase
(1999), respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. Section one provides an update on changes in the
earnings distribution in CE transition economies during the second half of the 1990s. Section
two examines wage determination  - returns to different human capital characteristics  - and
the sources of earnings inequality. Section three concludes.
3  Albania,  Croatia,  Estonia,  and Slovakia  are excluded  due  to the lack  of time-series  data on earnings
distribution.
3BOX  MEASURING EARNINGS INEQUALITY
Measuring earnings inequality is intrinsically difficult for a at least three
reasons.  First, results often differ depending on the source of data. Employer
based surveys usually yield different results than household based surveys. For
example, in Poland according to the (employer based) Survey of Earnings
Distribution wages are more unequally distributed in the private than in the
public sector. However, according to the (household based) Labor Force Survey
the result is exactly the opposite. Different data sources can also give raise to
substantially different measured magnitude of wage inequality. For example in
Macedonia according to the Labor Force Survey the Gini coefficient for wages
amounts to 24, indicating low inequality, while according to the Family Budget
Survey it amounts to 31, indicating relatively high inequality (both surveys are
household based). These differences according to the source partly reflect
differences in survey coverage and the adopted definition of earnings. For
example, small firms, let alone informal sector firms, are usually
underrepresented in employer based surveys.
Second, results often differ depending on the applied definition of
earnings. In particular, the distribution of earnings tends to be different from
that of an hourly wage rate. For example, in Poland private sector workers enjoy
a significant earnings  premium over public sector workers if eamings are
measured on a monthly basis. However, this premium disappears if the
comparison is based on hourly wage rates.
Third, eamings tend to be misreported. Both employers and workers may
underreport actual earnings to avoid a discrepancy between eamings reported for
tax and survey purposes. For example the official survey of earnings
distribution in Bulgaria shows an abnormally high concentration of earnings in
the lowest wage bracket. Moreover, earnings tend to be measured imprecisely,
with a wide margin of error.
4CHANGES  IN THE  EARININGS DISTRIBUTION
Earnings  inequality
Earnings  inequality  has  strongly  increased  during  the  transition  in  virtually  all
transition economies of  Central Europe (CE).  During the period of  1989-1997 in most
countries in the region the Gini coefficient - a summary measure of inequality - increased by
6-8 points (Table 1). Although most countries conformed to  this pattern, there were some
notable exceptions.  Macedonia stands out as a country where the increase in inequality was
relatively modest (4 points),  while Romania is  the opposite case of  an  extremely high
increase in eamings inequality (over 20 points).  These two extreme cases notwithstanding,
CE has experienced a considerable but not exorbitant increase in the eamings dispersion, the
latter being characteristic of the FSU.
The widening of  the  earnings distribution  that has  occurred during the  transition
amounted to  a  transition  from  a  low  to  a  relatively  high  eamings inequality status.
Inequality is a relative concept, so in  order to  assess the level of inequality one needs a
benchmark.  We will compare eamings inequality in transition economies of CE to that in
advanced OECD countries. And for the sake of comparability,  as a measure of inequality we
will use the Decile Ratio - a ratio of the top decile earnings to the bottom decile eamings. In
West European OECD countries the Decile Ratio ranges from around 2.0 (Italy, Sweden) to
around 3.5 (Austria, U.K.), with most countries falling into the 2.5-3.0 range. The U.S is an
outlier with the Decile Ratio reaching 5.5. Against this background, all transition economies
of CE should be categorized as countries characterized by relatively high eamings inequality.
In all countries under question the Decile Ratio exceeds 3.0, which can be adopted as a
conventional threshold marking above the average inequality.  In fact, in most of the CE
countries the Decile Ratio exceeds 3.5, that is the level of earnings inequality observed in the
U.K., the most unequal West European country.  In a number of countries inequality is still
higher: in Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Romania the Decile Ratio exceeds 4.0 - the level
of eamings dispersion not observed in Westem Europe, although still below that in the U.S.
5Accordingly, with respect to earnings inequality, the transition economies of CE can be
divided into two groups:
*  Modest to  high  inequality (Decile  Ratio less  or  equal to  3.5):  Czech Republic,
Macedonia, Poland, Slovenia;
*  High  to  very  high  inequality  (Decile  Ratio  more  than  3.5):  Bulgaria,  Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Romania.
Thus virtually all transition economies of CE should be considered as high inequality
countries, although in some of them the level of earnings dispersion is still close to the
European standards, while in others it approaches the US standards.  However, it should be
stressed that, in general, earnings inequalities in CE  are not exorbitant, such as those  in
developing  countries, or  in  some  of  FSU  countries.  They are  high  by  the  European
standards, not by the world standards.
In all countries for which data are available, earnings dispersion in the private sector is
significantly higher than in the public sector (Table 2).4  In the private  sector the  Gini
coefficient is from 3 to  10 points higher than in the public sector, indicating a substantially
wider earnings distribution.  As a rule, the gap between low paid workers and the median
worker is larger in the private than in the public sector.  Also the distance between top paid
workers and the median worker tends to be larger in the private sector.  For example, in
Poland the bottom decile worker earns 62 percent of the median earnings in the public sector
and only 54 percent in the private sector.  Similarly, the top decile worker earns 195 percent
of the median earnings in the public sector and 212 percent in the private sector.
Has earnings inequality been continuously increasing since the outset of transition, or
are there  signs that the trend toward greater inequality has tapered out,  or maybe even
reversed?  It turns out that there is no clear pattern common to all countries.  In a  few
countries earnings distribution has  still  been exploding.  Romania  is  the most  notable
example: the Decile Ratio rose to around 5 in 1999 from 4.1 in 1996 and 3.6 in 1995, which
4  Data on wage distribution shown in Table 2 are not comparable with those in Table I since the former
come from household based surveys while the latter from employer based surveys (with the exception of Pc  land
where the same source is used in both cases). The reason for using different sources is that the employer based
surveys as a rule do not allow for a sectoral (public/private) break-down of the wage data.
6is a huge surge.  Also in Hungary earnings dispersion keeps increasing at a relatively high
rate. By contrast, Poland and Slovenia are examples of countries which still experience some
increases in earnings inequality but at a very modest rate.  In both these countries the Decile
Ratio hardly increased since the mid 1  990s,  suggesting that a new equilibrium was reached.
An interesting process of inequality being actually reversed can be observed in the Czech
Republic, Latvia, and to  a lesser extent, Lithuania.  For example in Lithuania the Decile
Ratio fell from 7 in  1994 around 4 in the late  1990s.  Earnings inequality is still high in
Lithuania, but incomparably lower than it was just a few years earlier. In the Czech Republic
and in Latvia the fall in eamings inequality was less dramatic. However these there countries
provide an important lesson that the increase in inequality is not inexorable, and it can be
reversed.
7Table  1:
Summary  of Earnings  Distribution,  1989-1999
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Bulgaria  a)
P1O  ..  63.3  56.3  ..  56.9  ..  ..  55.6
P90  ..  162.9  171.9  ..  178.0  ..  ..  198.7
Decile  ratio  ..  2.6  3.1  ..  3.1  ..  ..  3.6
Gini coefficient  ..  0.213  0.262  ..  0.25  ..  ..  0.292
Czech  Republic
PlO  61.3  ..  63.2  60.8  57.0  57.6  49.4  60.4  58.2  57.4  59.1
P90  148.7  ..  163.5  166.7  182.4  181.3  182.7  172.9  173.7  173.0  177.8
Decile ratio  2.4  ..  2.6  2.7  3.2  3.1  3.7  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.0
Gini coefficient  0.198  ..  0.210  0.212  0.257  0.259  0.282  0.255  0.260  0.258  0.257
Latvia
P1O  ..  ..  58.4  46.3  55.3  50.1  45.4  48.4  47.4  44.9  47.4
P90  ..  ..  179.8  206.0  185.1  204.6  208.1  215.4  209.6  205.7  202.5
Decile  ratio  ..  ..  3.1  4.4  3.3  4.1  4.6  4.4  4.4  4.6  4.3
Gini coefficient  ..  ..  0.249  0.338  0.282  0.327  0.344  0.349  0.335  0.331  0.332
Lithuania
PlO  ..  ..  ..  42.4  ..  31.2  42.1  50.3  52.4  51.2  49.3
P90  ..  . ..  221.0  ..  236.6  231.0  220.4  216.6  224.9  228.7
Decile ratio  ..  ..  ..  5.2  ..  7.6  5.5  4.4  4.1  4.4  4.6
Gini coefficient  ..  ..  ..  0.385  ..  0.391  0.374  0.342  0.339  0.353  0.363
FYR
Macedonia
P1O  ..  60.2  55.0  60.4  51.3  61.2  49.6  58.9  55.6  57.0  55.7
P90  ..  165.5  185.6  169.5  182.8  179.6  176.9  180.0  180.1  183.5  187.5
Decile  ratio  ..  2.7  3.4  2.8  3.6  2.9  3.6  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.4
Gini coefficient  ..  0.223  0.267  0.235  0.271  0.253  0.270  0.250  0.259  0.269  0.274
8Table  1:
Summary  of Earnings  Distribution  (cont.)
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Hungary  c)
PlO  58.3  57.7  ..  56.6  55.9  54.7  ..  ..  51.4
P90  183.0  196.4  ..  201.2  205.2  207.4  ..  ..  214.0
Decile ratio  3.1  3.4  ..  3.6  3.7  3.8  ..  ..  4.2
Gini coefficient  0.268  0.291  ..  0.304  0.315  0.323  ..  ..  0.349
Poland
P1O  65.4  ..  61.6  61.6  60.1  58.5  58.3  57.3  56.7  57.2  56.2
P90  159.0  ..  176.1  179.8  181.9  196.5  197.0  198.4  200.3  193.6  199.2
Decile ratio  2.4  ..  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.4  3.4  3.5  3.5  3.4  3.5
Gini coefficient  0.205  ..  0.242  0.247  0.257  0.281  0.288  0.295  0.301  0.293  0.305
Romania
PIO  74.3  ..  66.8  ..  61.1  57.7  52.0  49.3  41.5  39.3  46.0
P90  145.1  ..  161.9  ..  168.6  177.6  185.9  199.9  216.0  215.1  227.9
Decile ratio  2.0  ..  2.4  ..  2.8  3.1  3.6  4.1  5.2  5.5  5.0
Gini coefficient  0.156  ..  0.205  ..  0.229  0.228  0.283  0.304  0.422  0.357  0.381
Slovenia
P1O  62.1  62.2  56.5  59.3  58.7  59.8  60.2  59.9  60.1  59.5  58.9
P90  164.9  173.4  178.1  177.7  181.6  190.3  191.3  194.8  200.0  196.8  197.0
Decile ratio  2.7  2.8  3.2  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3
Gini  coefficient  0.222  0.228  0.269  0.261  0.273  0.275  0.292  0.298  0.302  0.306  0.305
Notes:
Unless noted otherwise, earnings are defined as gross monthly earnings, including  monthly equivalents of bonuses and allowances.
P 1O  denotes the earnings of the bottom decile relative to the median, expressed as a percentage.
The  decile ratio is the ratio of the  top decile to the bottom decile, i.e. 1'90/1'10.
a)  Data refer to the public sector only.
b)  Net earnings
c)  1988 instead of 1989.
Source:  UNICEF's  TransMONEE  database;  Author's  calculations.  An earlier  version  of this  table was prepared  for  the paper  by Rashid  and Rutkowski  (2001).
9Table 2:
Earnings Distribution in the Public and Private Sectors
Gini  Decile  Ratio  PIO  P90
Bulgaria (1997)
Public sector  0.393  5.7  43.8  250.0
Private sector  0.415  4.8  44.1  213.1
Hungary (1997)
Public sector  0.221  2.4  66.2  161.8
Private sector  0.279  3.0  63.0  188.9
Macedonia (1996)
Public sector  0.262  3.3  50.0  162.5
Private sector  0.359  3.8  57.1  214.3
Poland (1997)
Public sector  0.271  3.1  61.8  194.5
Private sector  0.341  3.9  54.0  211.6
Notes:
Inequality measures based on sample order statistics (P 10. P90, Decile Ratio) are likely to be biased. Thisi
caused by the fact that people tend to round off their earnings which results in bunching of reported earning:;  at
certain values (e.g. 1,000, 2,000). This problem is often aggravated by the small sample size. Accordingly, the
inter-sectoral comparisons based on these measures may be not reliable. The Gini coefficient, which is based on
all observations in the sample is more robust.
Bulgaria. Hungary and Macedonia: net monthly eamings of full-time workers
Poland: Gross monthly earnings of full-time workers
In Macedonia the public sector includes state, cooperative, and socially (worker) owned
enterprises. The private sector includes private and mixed (partly private) enterprises.
Source:
Bulgaria: Integrated Household Survey, 1997.
Hungary: Hungarian Household Panel Survey,  TARKI, 1997
Macedonia: Family Budget Survey, 1996.
Poland: Eamings Distribution Survey,  September 1997, GUS, Warsaw.
Author's  calculations.
Macedonia  offers  yet  another  example  of an fluctuating  trend  in  earnings  inequality.
One year  inequality  goes  up, just  to  go  down  the next  year,  and  the  whole  process  then  is
repeated.  One can not exclude that  some measurement  error is involved  and the fluctuations
are  spurious.  However,  the time  series  seems  too  long to  reflect  a purely  random  process.
One possible  explanations  is that these  fluctuations  are caused  by two  countervailing  forces,
which  take  turns  to  prevail.  One  is  market  forces  toward  more  flexible  wage  structure
10reflecting demand and supply conditions. The other is institutional forces (union bargaining)
which oppose the trend toward greater inequality. 5
Thus, the inequality trend has had several distinct patterns in CE.  In some countries
the growth in inequality was strongly concentrated during the early stage of the transition
(Poland, Slovenia).  In others inequality continues to growth at a stable rate (Hungary), in
still others the  growth in  inequality accelerated during the late  1990s (Romania).  In a
number of countries after an initial growth inequality begun to fall, although it keeps to be
relatively high.  A unique example of Macedonia is likely to point to the fact that wage
distribution is a product of a joint  influence of different forces, in particular market and
institutional ones, which often run in opposite directions.
In all CE countries the widening of the earnings distribution has taken place at its both
ends. The relative position of workers in the bottom of the distribution has deteriorated while
the position of those in the top has improved.  However, the latter effect was dominant, that
is  the  newly  gained  affluence  of  top  paid  workers  was  more  pronounced  than  the
impoverishment of the low paid workers.
Changes at the bottom of earnings distribution
Before the transition in virtually all CE countries workers at the bottom decile used to
be paid over 60 percent of the median earnings. In Romania they received as much as three-
quarters of the median.  Only in Hungary, which introduced the decentralized wage setting
earlier than other countries in the region, bottom decile workers received somewhat less than
60 percent of the median earnings. Thus, before the transition the gap between the low paid
worker and the median worker was relatively small, smaller than in most OECD countries.
The transition and associated decentralization of the wage setting have in most cases
dramatically changed this  situation.  Low paid workers have seen their relative earnings
status significantly deteriorate.  Romania offers the most striking example.  At present the
bottom decile worker earns just over 40 percent of the median earnings, which implies that in
the course of transition the 50-10 earnings gap increased by almost 30 percentage points.
This is indeed a huge change. In most other countries the deterioration in the earnings status
5  Unions are extremely strong in Macedonia, even in the privatized enterprises. They bargain at an
industry  level and  have  an explicit  target  of limiting  the wage  disperion  by imposing  compressed  wage  scales.
11of low paid workers was less dramatic but still substantial; the 50-10 gap increased by nearly
ten points.  As a result, currently the bottom decile worker earns about 45 to 55 of the median
earnings,  which is below the range typical of OECD countries.
There is a number of notable exceptions to this overall pattern.  Latvia, Lithuania (in
mid-1990s), and Romania are examples of economies where the downward adjustment of
relative wages of low productivity workers has been especially marked.  By contrast, the
Czech Republic, Slovenia, and to a lesser extent Poland, are examples of economies where
this adjustment has been much more modest.  Slovenia stands out  as an  extreme in this
respect: in 1999 the 50-10 earnings gap at 59 percent was only 3 points lower than in 1989.6
Why in some economies the fall in relative wages of low productivity workers has
been much more pronounced that in others?  The thorough examination of this issue goes
beyond the scope of this paper.  Her we limit ourselves to pointing to some institutional
factors that affect wage setting and in particular may account for the existence of wvage
floors.  Two factors seem to play a decisive role: (a) the minimum wage, and (b) union
bargaining.  These two  factors are not  independent.  Specifically, union  strength often
influences the way the minimum wage is set and thus influences its level.  It is quite ob'vious
that  the  higher  the  minimum  wage  as  the  proportion  of  the  average  wage,  the  more
compressed is the  bottom part  of  the  earnings  distribution, although there  is  no  strict
relationship between the 50-10 wage gap and the "bite" of the minimum wage.  For example,
the minimum wage as a  percentage of the average  wage is relatively low in the Czech
Republic (less than 30 percent), while the 50-10 gap is relatively small.  By contrast, in
Hungary the minimum wage is relatively high (around 47 percent of the average wage),
while the 50-10 wage gap is quite large.  Obviously, there are supporting examples, too.  In
Latvia and Romania the minimum wage is low relative to the average wage and so is the
bottom decile wage (i.e. the 50-10 gap is large).
One could expect that the bottom of the earnings distribution is more compressed in
countries where trade unions are stronger, have more members and the coverage of collective
agreements is wider.  These factors often depend on the relative size of the private sector, the
6  It would be interesting to correlate the wage adjustment with the unemployment rates, but this would go
beyond the scope of this study.
12mode of privatization and the governance structure, as well as the level at which bargaining
takes place.  Unions tend to be stronger in those transition economies where the size of the
private sector is relatively small, privatization has not led to the significant change in the
governance structure (e.g. manager and employee buy-out), and bargaining is centralized
(national or industry level bargaining as opposed to firm level bargaining).  These variables
are difficult to measure which is one reason why the formal test of the hypothesis of the
correlation between the union strength and the compression of the wage distribution is not
carried out here.  Not attempting to "prove" the suggested relationship, we can cite the
examples of Macedonia and Poland as countries where strong trade unions are successful in
protecting the relative earnings position of low paid workers.  Interestingly, in Macedonia
there is no national minimum wage, but still strong worker representation in both public and
privatized firms as well as industry level bargaining, which covers all firms in an industry,
result in a relatively favorable position of low paid workers.  By contrast, in Latvia and
Lithuania, where unions are weaker, the position of low paid workers is less favorable.
It should be noted that in most countries the widening of the 50-10 earnings gap has
taken place in the context of the fall in the real value of the median wage.  This implies that
low paid workers lost in relative and in absolute terms.  Their real wages have fallen both as
a result of the falling average wage and the growing wage dispersion.
Changes at the top of the earnings distribution
As  already  mentioned, most  of  the action  has taken place  at the  top  end of  the
distribution.  The tTansition entails  the emergence of  high  earnings, which  were  not
attainable under the communism. Before the transition the top decile worker used to earn 50
to 60 percent more than the median worker.  At present, in most countries in the region the
top decile worker earns at least twice as much as the median worker.  The gap between the
top paid workers and the median workers has thus dramatically increased. High productivity
is currently rewarded considerably more than before the transition.
13The increase in the 90-50 earnings gap has been so substantial, that in some cases it has
compensated for the fall in the average level of wages that has occurred during the initial
phase of the transition.  For example, in Slovenia the top decile worker earns a few percent
more than before the transition despite that the average wage is more than 10 percent below
its  pre-transition level.  In  the  Czech  Republic  and  Poland  top  decile  workers  earn
substantially more than before the transition (20-40 percent), while the average wage has
barely recovered from the initial plunge.  However, in countries which experienced a really
dramatic fall in real wages, such as Latvia or Romania where wages fell by over 30 percent,
even top decile workers have suffered a real earnings loss.
The incidence of low and high pay
Another facet of the widening the of eamings distribution is the growing number of
both low and high earners.  In the course of the transition low wages have become even
lower and more people are earning  them.  Similarly, the earnings status of highly paid
workers has improved and the ranks of the high paid have swollen.  As a result, those of the
middle of the distribution - a vast  majority under central planning - have become less
numerous.  Table 3 illustrates this  process.  It uses  standard definitions of  low pay  as
earnings lower than two-thirds of the median and high pay as eamings higher than 1.5 times
the median earnings.
It is not surprising that the increase in the proportion of low- and high-paid workers is
correlated with the increase in earnings dispersion.  Those countries which experienced the
largest decompression of the earnings distribution also experienced the largest rise in the
numbers of low- and high-paid jobs.  Currently in Romania there are five times as man) low
paid workers as before the transition, and three times  as many high  paid workers.  By
contrast in Slovenia or Macedonia the increase in both low and high paying jobs was rather
modest.  The Czech Republic is an untypical example: while the percentage of high paid
workers nearly doubled during the  1990s, the percentage of low-paid workers has stayed
close to the pre-transition level.
Despite the differences in dynamics, virtually all transition economies of CE ended up
with a relatively high incidence of both low- and high-pay.  In most CE countries low paid
workers account for  17 to 25 percent of employment.  In comparison, in most European
14OECD countries the incidence of low pay does not exceed 15 percent, and only in the U.K. it
reaches 20 percent.  The U.S. is an outlier, with the incidence of low-pay at 25 percent
(OECD, 1996).
Against the backdrop OECD countries, most transition economies are characterized by
very high incidence of low pay.  Countries where it exceeds 20 percent include Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania.  In Macedonia, Poland and Slovenia the incidence
of low pay is relatively high, but below the 20 percent. Only in the Czech Republic the
incidence of low pay is relatively low (16 percent), comparable to that prevailing in OECD
countries.
7  Data  for  Bulgaria  in 1997  come  from  a household  based  survey,  and for the sake  of comparability  are
not shown  in Table  2.
15Table 3:
The Incidence  of Low- and High-pay,  1989-1999
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Bulgaria  a, b)
Low  paid workers  ..  13.2  18.4  ..  17.8  ..  ..  18.5
Highly  paid  workers  ..  21.9  16.9  ..  17.6  ..  ..  21.5
Czech  Republic
Low  paid workers  14.7  12.9  14.0  17.5  16.9  22.6  14.8  11.0  16.8  15.5
Ilighly paid  workers  9.6..  14.0  14.5  18.9  17.9  19.5  16.2  23.8  16.3  16.1
Latvia
Low  paid workers  ..  ..  16.6  25.7  17.1  77.2  25.3  24.7  24.8  26.4  26.4
Highly  paid workers  ..  ..  18.5  23.7  18.8  10.6  23.5  24.0  23.8  22.7  21.3
Lithuania
Low  paid workers  ..  ..  ..  25.8..  30.5  31.3  26.3  24.8  25.7  27.8
llighly  paid  workers  ..  ..  ..  25.7..  29.2  29.5  26.2  24.8  26.6  27.4
FYR  Macedonia
Low  paid workers  ..  14.5  22.5  14.9  20.8  19.9  21.9  15.8  18.9  18.4  19.4
I-lighly  paid workers  ..  14.4  19.3  15.6  18.8  18.0  15.2  17.8  17.4  18.2  18.9
Hungary  c)
Low  paid workers  17.5  17.7  ..  18.9  19.1  20.0  ..  ..  21.5
Highly  paid workers  18.6  20.8  ..  21.9  22.2  22.0  ..  ..  23.1
Poland
Low  paid workers  11.0  ..  14.0  14.2  15.7  17.2  17.3  18.3  18.8  18.2  18.6
Highly  paid workers  12.6  ..  16.6  17.5  18.1  20.3  20.5  20.8  21.0  20.1  21.1
Romania
Low  paid workers  4.5  ..  9.9  ..  13.0  19.0  20.9  22.4  25.3  25.4  25.6
Highly  paid  workers  8.3  ..  13.5  ..  15.2  20.7  19.6  21.2  24.5  24.0  25.0
Slovenia
Low  paid workers  14.2  14.1  17.6  16.3  16.3  15.8  15.6  16.1  16.8  16.3  17.2
Highly  paid  workers  14.5  17.3  17.2  17.5  18.0  19.5  19.9  19.5  19.8  19.8  20.2
Data  not available
Notes: The incidence of low (high) pay =  low (high) paid workers as a pcrcentage  of all tull-time wage and salary workers.
Low pay is defined as less than two-thirds of median earnings for all full-time workers
lligh pay is defined as more than 1.5 times the median earnings
a)  Data  refcr  to the public  sector  only.
b)  Net earnings
c)  1988 instcad of 1989.
Source: UNICEF's  TransMONEE database; Author's calculations. An earlicr  version of this table was prepared for the paper by Rashid and Rutkowski (2001).
16Well paying jobs have also become quite common in transition economies. In most of
the countries under question, 20 to 25 percent of workers currently earn more than 1.5 times
the median earnings.  As a result the middle of the distribution has shrunk.  For example in
Poland - where the changes in the distribution have been relatively modest - the proportion
of middle paying jobs declined from 76 percent before the transition to just over 60 percent
in  1997.  However in Romania - where the distribution has changed dramatically - the
percentage of middle paying jobs plummeted from 87 to 50 percent.
Where are the bad and good jobs  located?  Does the private sector offer better job
opportunities than  the public  sector?  Not  necessarily.  The  incidence of  low  pay  is
substantially higher in the private sector in all countries (Table 4).8 A private sector worker
is about 50 percent more likely to be low-paid than the public sector worker.  For example in
Poland low paid jobs account for as much as 22 percent of private sector jobs and only 15
percent of public sector jobs.  Obviously, this is a simplistic picture as it does not allow for
the inter-sectoral differences in industry structure, firm size, human capital and other factors.
The private sector tends to  be concentrated in industries such as trade and construction,
which pay lower wages.  Also, private firms are usually much smaller than public firms, and
this may be the primary reason why they pay lower wages.  Nonetheless, the fact that the
bottom tail of the earnings distribution is heavier in the private sector than in the public
sector, by  itself  seems to  be  an  important observation.  It may help to  understand the
resistance of  some  groups of  workers (especially less  skilled manual  workers) toward
privatization.
What about well paying jobs?  Here the evidence is less clear-cut.  In some countries
they are more common in the private sector, in others still in the public sector (Table 4).  The
sample is too small to make generalizations, but the limited evidence suggests that the private
sector has become an attractive employer in more advanced transition economies, such as
Hungary and Poland, while it is still the public sector which is a more attractive employer in
less advanced economies, such as Bulgaria and Macedonia
8  Given that the data come from household based surveys (except for Poland), there is no reason to assume
that private sector earnings are underreported relative to public sector earnings (this kind of bias potentially
could have occurred if the data where coming from employer based surveys).
17Table  4:
The Incidence  of Low- and High-pay  by Sector
Incidence of
Low pay  High pay
Bulgaria (1997)
Public  sector  22.1  29.4
Private  sector  33.3  18.4
Hungary (1997)
Public  sector  10.7  12.5
Private  sector  15.9  17.6
Macedonia (1996)
Public  sector  13.1  20.1
Private  sector  17.5  18.5
Poland (1997)
Public  sector  14.5  20
Private sector  21.7  22.9
Notes:
Data presented in this table come from different sources than data presented in Table 3 and thus are
not comparable.
The incidence of low (high) pay =  low (high) paid workers as a percentage of all full-time wage and
salary workers.
Low pay is defined as less than two-thirds of median earnings for all full-time workers
High pay is defined as more than 1.5 times the median earnings
Source:
Bulgaria: Integrated Household Survey, 1997.
Hungary: Hungarian Household Panel Survey. TARKI, 1997
Macedonia:  Family Budget Survey, 1996.
Poland: Earnings Distribution Survey, September 1997, GUS, Warsaw.
Author's calculations.
SOURCES OF EARNINGS INEQUALITY
A number of factors causes earnings of individual workers to  differ.  They can be
grouped into two  broad categories: (a)  individual specific factors and  (b)  firn  specific
factors.  Individual specific factors relate to human capital: education, skills, labor market
experience, innate abilities, gender.  Firm  specific factors include  ownership, degree of
monopoly power,  union  strength,  size,  capital-to-labor ratio,  etc.  Unfortunately, data
availability limits the extent to which we are able to estimate the impact of these factors on
18earnings variation.  Below we attempt to present available evidence on the role of some of
these factors, including education, experience, gender, and firm ownership.
Educational attainment
Returns  to  education  (educational  premia)  were  traditionally  low  under  central
planning and thus differences in educational attainment had  a limited impact on earnings
variation.  In the course of transition this situation has changed dramatically.  Returns to
education have considerably increased in  all transition economies of  CE  (for which the
relevant data are available) and now by and large they are comparable to those observed in
advanced  market  economies.  Accordingly, the  increase  in  returns  to  education has
significantly contributed  to the increase in earnings inequality.
Poland is a typical example. Before the transition a university educated worker earned
on average around 35 percent more than a worker with primary education.  Already at the
early  stage  of  the  transition  - in  1993 - the  picture  was  radically  different.  The
university/primary earnings differential increased to  almost 75 percent,  that is more than
doubled.  Such a sharp increase in educational premia provided a huge boost to earnings
inequality.  Interestingly, the increase in the educational premia in Poland took place almost
entirely during the early  stage of the transition; in  the late  1990s educational earnings
differentials are virtually the same as they were in 1993.
Table 5 summarizes available evidence on the changes in educational premia in the CE
region.  The premia are derived from the human capital (Mincer type) earnings function,
which means that they show an independent impact of education on earnings variance.  The
data clearly show that high skills, undervalued under central planning, have begun to pay-off.
Especially strong was the increase in the university earnings premium, while the premium to
secondary education increased much more modestly.  Similarly as in Poland, the increase in
returns to education became visible already in the early years of the transition.
19Table 5:
Educational  Premia Before and at the Early Stage of the Transition
Percentage wage margins above the reference category
<Primary  Primary  Vocational  Secondary  College  University
Czech R.
1984a  Ref.  8.3  21  36.8
1992a  Ref  9.5  30.9  48.6
Menb
1988  Ref.  5.0  13.5  34.4
1992  Ref  9.3  23.4  46.0
Womenb
1988  Ref.  6.7  21.6  50.4
1992  Ref.  8.4  30  54.5
Bulgaria
Men
1989  Ref  5.26  8.43  1.47
1992  Ref  1.57  5.44  14.15
Women
1989  Ref  3.67  3.02  21.07
1992  Ref  12.3  19.31  29.9
Polandd
1987  5.0 % per year of schooling
1992  7.9 % per year of schooling
1993  7.3 % per year of schooling,
Hungary'
Men
1986  -10.6 ref.  11.5  19.6  51.4
1989  -4.2 ref  12.1  27.2  70.4
1992  -12.5 ref.  13.4  36.6  81.5
Women
1986  -18.3 ref  14.4  25.4  63.9
1989  -6.3 ref.  15.3  32.3  77.8
1992  -12.5 ref.  17.4  37.5  80.3
Slovakia'
1984  ref  8.3  21  36.8
1992  ref  11  30.9  50.7
Slovenia'
Men
1987  ref  4.4  16.3  31.9  52  71.5
1991  ref.  10.7  20.1  40.6  67.7  94.3
Women
1987  ref.  7.9  16.4  37  56.9  76.8
1991  ref  11.2  18.3  46.5  68.5  94.0
Note:
Estimated  from  Mincer  type earnings  functions
Source,  estimated  variable,  explanatory  variables:
a) Sakova  (1996),  gross  earnings,  gender,  experience,  experience2.  schooling  dummies
b) Vecernik  (1995),  gross  earnings,  experience,  experience2,  schooling  dummies
c) Orazem and Vodopivec (1995), hourly earnings, gender, experience, experience2,  schooling
dummies  ethnicity,  region,  industry
d) Rutkowski  (1996a),  net earnings,  gender,  experience,  experience2,  years in school.  industry
e) Kertesi  and Kollo  (1999),  gross  earnings,  experience,  experience2,  schooling  dummies
f) Jones  and Ilayperuma  (1994),  experience,  experience2,  schooling  dummies,  gender,  industry,
region,  plus  other  controls  (marital  status,  ethnicity,  firm size,  union  membership,  contract  type,  etc.)
Source: Adopted from Kertesi and Kollo (1999)
20Table 6 presents a more recent snapshot data from a somewhat different sample of
CE economies. The data reinforce the message that the educational earnings differentials
are currently quite high in CE, virtually regardless of the progress of market oriented
reforms.  In Bulgaria and Macedonia the return to one year of schooling, at around 7
percent, that is similar as in Poland.  It is noteworthy that this rate of return to schooling
is characteristic of  developed market economies  (Psacharapoulos, 1994).  Similarly,
returns to different levels of education in Latvia are close to those observed in Poland.
These relatively high returns account for the increased earnings dispersion.
In  advanced  transition  economies,  such  as  Hungary  and  Poland,  educational
earnings differentials tend to  be  significantly larger in the private than in the public
sector.9  This  explains (at least partly) why in  the private sector earnings are more
dispersed. For example in Poland, the university/primary education earnings differential
accounts for some 70 percent in the public sector and for about 120 percent in the private
sector (Table 7). A similar pattern is observed in Hungary.  In contrast, in less advanced
transition economies, such as Bulgaria and Macedonia, there is no private sector premium
for high skills.  One possible explanation for the existence of the private sector earnings
premium in more advanced transition economies and the absence of such a premium in
less advanced economies may be  the different  industrial composition of  the private
sector.  In  Hungary and  Poland the  private  sector has developed in  skill intensive
industries (e.g. finance) while in Bulgaria and Macedonia it is concentrated in less skill
intensive industries (e.g. trade). Accordingly, the private sector demand for high skills in
Hungary and Poland is higher than in Bulgaria and Macedonia. In fact, once the industry
structure is controlled for, educational premia in  the private sector in Macedonia go
significantly  up and are virtually the same as in the public sector.
9  In the Czech Republic the picture is more complex. Munich et al. (1998) report that "there is no
significant difference in the return to a year of education form men or women across [... ] three types of
ownership.  [...]  However the return to a university degree is significantly  higher in the privatized
enterprises and coops than in the SOEs and public administration for women, but not for men".
21Table 6:
Educational Premia at the Second Stage of the Transition
Per year of  Primary  Vocational  Secondary Secondary  College  University
- schooling  technical  general
Bulgaria (1997)
National economy  6.5 reference  23.5  31.3  39.1  93.4
Public  sector  6.2  ..  ..  ..
Private  sector  6.8  ..  ..  ..
Men  6.9  ..  ..  ..
Women  6.1  ..  ..  ..
Hungary (1996) a  reference  12.9  21.2  77.5
Latvia (1998)
Men  ..  reference  11.6  25.9  71.6
Women  ..  reference  16.2  2.8  58.4
Macedonia (1996)
National  economy  7.0  ..  ..  ..
Public  sector  7.4  ..  ..  ..
Private  sector  5.9  ..  ..  ..
Men  6.0  ..  ..  ..
Women  7.4
Poland (1996)
National  economy  7.3  reference  9.3  31.5  34.0  34.4  77.4
Public  sector  6.0  ..  ..  ..




Estimated using Mincer type earnings functions.
Bulgaria: (log) monthly net earnings, years of schooling, experience, expereince2.
Latvia: (log) monthly earnings, schooling dummies, age, age2, nationality, marital status, region dummies,
rural/urban residence.
Macedonia: (log) monthly net earnings, years of schooling, experience, experience2, gender.
Poland: (log) monthly net earnings, years of schooling, actual experience, actual experience2. gender.
The premia are calculated as (exp(b)- I  )* 100, where b is the estimated coefficient on the pertinent education dummy
variable.
Source:
Bulgaria: Integrated Household Survey, 1997; author's calculations.
Hungary: Kollo and Kertesi (1999)
Latvia: Case (1999)
Macedonia: Family Budget Survey, 1996; author's calculations.
Poland: Labor Force Survey, May 1996; author's calculations.
22Table 7:
Educational Earnings Differentials by Sector
Public  sector  Private  sector
Bulgaria  (1997)
University  94.7  98.4
College  21.4  16.6
Secondary  technical  56.1  21.6
Secondary  general  17.0  1.8
Vocational  training
Hungary  (1996)
University  119.1  186.6
College  55.1  101.9
Secondary  technical  31.5  45.8
Secondary  general
Vocational  training  17.3  23.9
Macedonia  (1996)
University  79.5  35.5
College
Secondary  technical  33.9  2.4
Secondary  general
Vocational  training
Less than  primary  -6.5  -33.9
Poland  (1996)
University  69.2  119.1
College  13.2  32.1
Secondary  technical  27.9  27.9
Secondary  general  24.5  17.8
Vocational  training  17.0  6.8
Note: The table shows coefficients on the education dummy variables in human capital earnings
functions, transformed to obtain percentage wage differentials. Primary education is the reference
category
Source:
Bulgaria: Integrated Household Survey, 1997.
Hungary: Hungarian Household Panel Survey, TARKI, 1996
Macedonia: Family Budget Survey. 1996.
Poland: Labor Force Survey, May 1996
Author's calculations.
Labor market  experience
Actual  labor  market  experience  is  difficult  to  measure,  so  it  is  customary  that  it is
proxied  by potential  experience  defined  as  age  - years  of  schooling  - 6.  It  is  usually
assumed  that the experience-earnings  profile  has flattened during  the transition,  reflecting the
23fact that the experience gained during the previous regime is of lesser value in the market
economy.  Flanagan (1993), Rutkowski (1997) and Kollo and Kertesi (1999) provide some
empirical  support  for  this  hypothesis  for  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland  and  Hungary,
respectively.  For example in Poland, the earnings differential between a worker with 25
years of (potential) experience and a worker of the same education and gender with 5 years
of experience was 23 percent in 1996, down from 33 percent in 1987.  Analogous changes
have taken place in Hungary; Figure 1 gives their stylized representation. However, Orazem
and Vodopivec (1994) report a  more complex pattern for  Slovenia (experience-earnings
profile is flatter over first eight years but steeper thereafter).  Given that the impact of the
experience-earnings profile on the earnings distribution also depends on the relative cohort
size, it is difficult to  assess whether or not  changes in the profile contributed to  greater
earnings inequality.
Figure 1  Experience-earnings profile in Hungary before and during the transition
Experience-Earnings  Profile
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At present the importance of labor market experience in wage determination varies
visibly across the region (Table 8).  Earnings differentials between experience categories
24seem to be very large in Latvia, especially among women, and at the same time they play a
negligible role in Bulgaria and Macedonia.  Hungary and Poland are the intermediate cases,
with the premium for 20 years of additional experience of around 25 percent.
Table 8:
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Hungary (1996)  26.9
Macedonia (1996) a  4.1
Poland (1996)  23.1
Note:  The table shows coefficients on the gender dummy variable in human capital earnings
functions, transformed to obtain percentage earnings differentials.
a) Tenure with the current firmn
Source:
Bulgaria: Integrated Household Survey, 1997.
Hungary: Kollo and Kertesi (1999)
Latvia: Chase (1999)
Macedonia: Family Budget Survey, 1996.
Poland: Labor Force Survey,  May1  996.
Author's calculations.
Gender
In centrally planned economies, as in market economies, women earned less than men with
similar observable human capital characteristics.  For example in Hungary in  1989, after
controlling for human capital, and firm characteristics (size, productivity, capital-to-labor
ratio) a male worker earned on average 35 percent more than his female counterpart (Kollo
and Kertesi, 1999).  A significant gender wage gap was also observed in other centrally
planned economies, for example Bulgaria (Jones and Ilayperuma, 1994), Poland (Rutkowski,
1996a) or Slovenia (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1994).
25The transition to capitalism has improved women's  relative earnings position in most
countries  for  which  the  evidence is  available.  In  Bulgaria,  Hungary and  Poland  the
male/female  earnings differential  fell  by  about  10 percent  points  within just  3  years.
Apparently the transition to a market economy entailed an increase in the demand for skills
possessed by women.  One possible explanation of this trend may be the rapid expansion of
the services sector, traditionally neglected under central planning. The resultant narrowing of
the gender wage gap has held back the increase in earnings inequality.  If the gender wage
gap remained at its pre-transition level, inequality would have been greater than the one
actually observed.
Owing to the decline in the female/male earnings differential during the transition the
gender gap  is currently rather modest by international standards, albeit not negligible. It
ranges from 24 percent in Hungary to 27 percent in Poland, indicating that CE countries are
quite homogenous in this respect  (Table 9).  For comparison, the wage differential betveen
US men and women accounts for about 35 percent (Chase, 1999).  Correspondingly. the
contribution of gender wage differentials to inequality in CE transition economies is lower
than in the US.
Table  9:
Gender  earnings  differentials
Female/Male
earnings  differential
Bulgaria  (1997)  28.8
Hungary  (1996)  23.6
Latvia  (1998)  32.4
Macedonia  (1996)  24.7
Poland  (1996)  30.6
Note:  The table shows coefficients on the gender dummy variable in human capital earnings
functions, transformed to obtain percentage earnings differentials.
Source: Author's calculations using the following sources:
Bulgaria: Rutkowski (1998b)




26Private versus Public sector
The earnings differential between the private and the public sectors is relatively small
and thus does not seem to be an important source of inequality.  Only in Macedonia and
Poland the regression adjusted log earnings differential is statistically significant, however its
magnitude - less than ten percent - is modest.'0 In Bulgaria and Hungary the differential
between public and private sector earnings is statistically insignificant (Table 10). Moreover,
higher private sector eamings to some extent may compensate for longer hours of work. This
proves to be the case in Poland.  If monthly eamings are replaced by hourly wage rates then
the private/pubic wage differential is reduced or even disappears (Newell and Socha, 1997).  1
Table 10
Private/Public sector earnings differential
Private/Public sector
earnings differential
Bulgaria  (1997) a, b  -8.1
Hungary  (1996)  -1.0
Macedonia  (1996)  9.4  **
Poland  (1995) c  6.4 **
**  - significant at 1% level
Note: The table shows coefficients on the sector dummy variable in human capital earnings
functions, transformed to obtain percentage  earnings differentials.
Controls include education, experience, gender.,  industry and region.
a)  P-value =  10.5%
b)  Trade union membership was an additional control variable
c) Firm size was an additional control variable.
Source:
Bulgaria: Integrated Household Survey, 1997.
Hungary: Hungarian Household Panel Survey.  TARKI, 1997
Macedonia: Family Budget Survey. 1996.
Poland: Labor Force Survey, May 1995
Author's calculations.
10  Controls  included  education,  experience,  gender,  industry  and region.
11  The evidence  is not conclusive.  Adamchik  and Bedi (2000) found that the private sector  earnings
advantage  persists,  although  it is reduced,  even after adjusting  for work hours.  Specifically,  an average private
sector  worker has a 9 percent  earnings  advantage  over a comparable  and working  the same hours public  sector
worker.
27Industry premia
Inter-industry earnings differentials are a significant source of earnings variation.  In
Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia and Poland industry coefficients in earnings equations are
highly significant.  Similar result is reported for the Czech Republic (Munich, et al., 1999).
The magnitude of industry wage premia is often large.  Agriculture stands out as industry
where, other things being equal, earnings are considerably lower than in other industries. For
example, agricultural workers on average earn 20-30 percent less than their counterparts in
manufacturing.
Unfortunately, because of the lack of comparable data it is not possible to determine
whether the inter-industry wage differentials have lost or gained in importance compared to
the pre-transition period.  The only evidence comes from the Czech Republic and it is
ambiguous.  Under central planning there were fewer significant inter-industry differentials
for men but more for women (Munich et al., 1999).
Region and urban vs. rural residence
There is no clear evidence of large regional earnings differentials in Central European
economies.  However, workers in capital cities and urbanized regions tend to eam a premium
relative to workers in rural areas.  For example, in Hungary village workers eam some 20
percent less than comparable workers in the capital city, and 6 percent less than workers in
other large cities,  but virtually the same earnings as workers in small towns.  A similar
premium to large city residence occurs in Poland (Puhani 1997). In the Czech Republic, the
Prague (capital) effect is positive but insignificant in 1989 but becomes significant in  1996
(Munich, et al., 1999). However in Bulgaria most of regional coefficients are insignificant.
Macedonia is an  exception in  that rural workers earn a 6  percent premium over urban
workers.  Thus, it seems that regional eamings differentials to  some extent contribute to
earnings inequality, but they are not its important source.
Returns to unmeasurable skills
Earnings  inequality  and  its  changes  are also  caused by  changes in  the valuation  and
distribution of unmeasurable skills, such as innate abilities, motivation, language or computer
skills, etc.  An indirect evidence of changes in returns to non-measured skill components can
be obtained from the residual eamings distribution.  Hungary is the only country for which
28necessary time  series  data  is  available.  It  turns  out  that  "Residual  earnings  were
astonishingly stable over time with the notable exception of the 1  Oh percentile where there
was a  sudden upward jump in the mean residual real earnings between 1989 and  1992,"
(Kollo and Kertesi, 1999).  The authors interpret this  spectacular earnings rise of the best
paid  workers  as  a  sort  of  "privatization  gain".  That  is,  workers  with  the  highest
unmeasurable skills experienced a large earnings gain due to high value attached to those
skills by the developing private sector.  However, given that this gain occurred only at the
lOOthe percentile of the  distribution of unmeasurable skills,  its  impact on the earnings
inequality could not have been substantial. It should be stressed that the Hungary example is
not necessarily representative of other countries in the region, especially given that market
oriented reforms were  launched there  earlier than  in  other countries, and  thus  the  re-
evaluation of skills has begun earlier and has been spread over a longer period of time.
Contribution of selected variables to earnings inequality
To  what  extent  are  we  able  to  explain  earnings  inequality  by  observable
characteristics? What are major observable causes of inequality?  The answer to these two
questions summarizes the earlier analysis.  In the sample of CE transition economies for
which the results of the estimation of the earnings function are available the coefficient of
determination ranges from 20 (Latvia) to 40 (Hungary) percent, which is a standard result
(Table  11).  It  implies  that  most  of  the  variation  in  earnings reflects  the  impact of
unobservable  individual  or  firm  specific  factors,  and  hence  cannot  be  explained  by
observable characteristics. However it also implies that the impact of standard factors (such
as education, experience, gender, or industry affiliation) is in transition economies of CE not
much different from that  in  advanced market  economies.  In other words, in transition
economies earnings vary because of the similar reason as in mature market economies, and
thus similar are the main sources of earnings inequality.
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Contribution of Selected Variables to Log-earnings Inequality
Bulgaria  (1997)  Hungary  (1996)  Macedonia  (1996)  Poland  (1995)
Contribution of selected variables to log-earnings inequality as a percentage of:
Variable  Total  Explained  Total  Explained  Total  Explained  Total  Explained
variance  variance  variance  variance  variance  variance  variance  variance
Education  8.2  31.4  25.9  61.7  8.9  35.3  11.5  34.9
of which Tertiary  8.1  31.1  17.9  42.7 a  9.4  37.1  9.1  27.4
Experience  0.7  2.7  2.1  5.0  0.8  3.1 b  3.8  11.6
Gender  4.6  17.5  3.8  9.1  2.0  7.7  6.8  20.5
Occupation  ..  ..  ..  ..  5.0  19.8
Firm size  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  2.9  8.6
Private/public sector  1.3  5.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -1.6  -C.6  -1.9
Industry  9.5  36.3  4.8  11.3  8.4  33.1  8.7  26.3
Urban/rural  residence  2.0  7.7 c  5.5  13.1 d  0.6  2.5
Total explained (R2)  26.2  100.0  42.0  100.0  25.3  100.0  33.0  100.0
Unexplained  73.8  x  58.0  X  74.7  x  67.0  x
Total  100.0  x  100.0  X  100.0  x  100.0  x





d)  Categories included village, town, major city, and the capital city.
Source:
Bulgaria: Rutkowski (1998b)
Hungary: Hungarian Household Panel Survey, TARKI, 1997. Author's calculations.
Macedonia: Rutkowski (1998a)
Poland:  Rutkowski  (1997)
30Education seems to  be  the  single most  important factor  contributing to  earnings
inequality.  12  Differences  in  educational  attainment  explain  from  8  (Bulgaria)  to  26
(Hungary) percent of the total variance in earnings, or from 31 to 62 percent of the explained
variance.  Interestingly,  the effect of education comes predominantly from tertiary education.
For example in Poland education differences account for 35 percent of the explained variance
in earnings, of which tertiary education alone accounts for 27 percent.
Industry affiliation is second in importance, its effect being usually smaller than that of
education.  Industry premia explain from 5 (Hungary) to  10 (Bulgaria) percent of the total
variance in earnings and from 11 to 36 percent of the explained variance.  13
Gender is the distant third factor explaining variation in earnings.  Gender differences
account for less than ten percent of the total variance in earnings, and for 8 (Macedonia) to
21 (Poland) percent of the explained variance.
Other measurable factors are of secondary importance. Labor market experience plays
a  noticeable role only  in  Poland  and  Hungary.  Urban/rural differentials seem to  be  a
significant source of inequality only in  Hungary.  There are variables that contribute to
inequality, but no general conclusions can be drawn since they were not included in earnings
functions for all the countries.  These variables include occupation which accounts  for 5
percent of earnings inequality in Macedonia, and the firm size, which accounts for about 3
percent of inequality in Poland.
An interesting result is that the private sector by itself -independently of other factors -
does not contribute significantly to earnings inequality.  In all countries under question the
role of the private sector is either negligible or insignificant.
Why has inequality increased during the transition?
While it is relatively easy to explain the level of inequality, it is much more difficult  to
explain why it has increased.  Leaving aside the fundamental institutional factors, as well as
demand and supply shifts, one can set a more modest goal of decomposing the change in
12  Only  in Bulgaria  education  comes  second,  after  industry  affiliation.
13  One  possible  explanation  for  a small  contribution  of industry  wage  differentials  to earnings  inequality  in
Hungary is a relatively small agricultural sector. Consequently,  the eamings differential between agricultural
and other industries  - which tends to be particularly large - has relatively low weight in Hungary, and thus
contributes little to inequality.
31earnings dispersion into characteristics (endowments) effect, and changes in  coefficients
effect (returns to endowments). Unfortunately, in order to carry out such an exercise one
needs sufficiently long time series of individual record data, which are hardly available. The
only decomposition of changes in wage inequality was done for Poland for the period 1992-
1995 (Puhani, 1997).  This exercise was very limited, however, as it did not cover the pre-
transition period; and also because during the period under investigation inequality hardly
increased.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Puhani (1997) found that the changes in coefficients -- the
revaluation of  crucial labor market  characteristics - worked in  favor  of  an  increase  in
inequality.  By contrast, and less obviously, the changes in observed characteristics had a
decreasing impact on inequality.  Thus, overall inequality in Poland has changed less than it
would have if the distribution of characteristics not become conducive to lower inequality.
One  important  characteristic to  which  returns  have  substantially increased  during  the
transition is education.  It thus seems fair to say that the revaluation of human capital has
been the major driving force behind the increase in earnings inequality during the transition
in Poland, and most likely in other CE countries, as well.
SUMMARY
Earnings distribution has considerably widened in virtually all transition economies of
CE.  Still, in some countries the increase in earnings inequality has been relatively modest
(e.g. Macedonia), while in others it has been extremely large (e.g. Romania).  Leaving aside
the  extreme cases, the  increase  in  inequality in  CE  has  been substantial, although not
exorbitant.
The attained level of earnings inequality is high or very high by the OECD standards,
but  not  in  most  cases  not falling beyond  the OECD range.  Countries where  earnings
inequality is modestly high include the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Poland and Slovenia.
Countries where inequality is high or very high include Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary
and  Romania.  In the latter group earnings are more dispersed than in the  UK (country
characterized by the most unequal earnings distribution in Europe) but still lower than in the
US.
32The increase in earnings inequality was in most cases concentrated in the early years of
transition.  Then the patterns of changes in the earnings distribution have started to diverge.
One can distinguish four distinct groups of countries. In the first group of countries earnings
dispersion keeps increasing at a relatively high rate.  This group includes Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania.  In the second group the process of the widening of the earnings distribution
has apparently attenuated. This group includes Poland and Slovenia. In the third group after
an initial sharp rise earnings inequality has started to decline.  This group includes the Czech
Republic, Latvia and Lithuania.  The fourth, untypical, "group" consists of Macedonia,
where the trend of earnings inequality exhibits a cyclical pattern.
In all CE countries the widening of the earnings distribution has occurred at its both
tails.  The relative wage position of low paid workers has deteriorated, while the relative
position of highly paid workers has improved.  However, changes at the upper end of the
distribution have been more pronounced than changes at the bottom end.  The distance
between the top  paid workers and the median worker  has increased dramatically in  all
countries. By contrast, in some - although not all - cases, the gap between low paid workers
and the median worker has widened relatively modestly.  Countries where the low-paid
workers still enjoy relatively favorable  status include  the Czech Republic, Slovenia and
Poland.  Countries where the low-paid workers saw their status substantially worsen include
Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.
In most cases the changes in the earnings distribution have taken place against the
backdrop of falling real wages.  This implies that as a rule low paid workers have lost not
only in relative but also in absolute terms.  In contrast, highly paid workers often gained in
absolute terms, despite the fall in the average earnings.
The increase in earnings inequality in CE has also implied the increase in the incidence
of low and high pay.  As  a result the middle - dominant under central planning - has
markedly shrunk.  By the OECD standards the incidence of low pay is high to very high in
virtually all CE economies, except for the Czech Republic.
In all countries the incidence of low pay is significantly higher in the private than in the
public sector. As regards well paying jobs, the situation is less clear-cut.  In more advanced
transition economies, such as Hungary and Poland, well-paying jobs are concentrated in the
33private  sector.  In  contrast, in less advanced transition economies, such as Bulgaria and
Macedonia, it is still the public sector which is a main source of well-paying  jobs.
Returns to education, specifically to university education, have significantly increased
in  all transition economies  of  CE,  virtually regardless of  the progress of the economic
restructuring.  These  returns,  abnormally  low  under  central  planning,  are  at  present
comparable to those prevailing in advanced market economies.
This increase in educational premia is presumably the main observable cause of the
increase  in  earnings  inequality  in  all  CE  countries.  However, changes  in  returns  to
observable characteristics are only a part of the story.  Another part is changes in returns to
unobservable, individual and firm specific characteristics.  Owing to the lack of necessary
time series data, it is not possible to quantify the relative contribution of different factors to
the increase in earnings dispersion.
Education is the single most important observable characteristic explaining the current
level of inequality. Differences in educational attainment account for around one-third of the
explained variation in earnings.  Hungary is exceptional in that education accounts for as
much as 60 percent of the explained variation in earnings.
The second most important factor contributing to earnings inequality is inter-industry
wage differentials. Gender comes third, but its impact is relatively small. Other factors, such
as  labor  market  experience,  firm  ownership,  urban/rural  residence  are  of  secondary
importance, or insignificant.
To conclude, the increase in educational earnings differentials stands out as the major
observable force behind the widening of the earnings distribution which has occurred during
the transition in CE.  At the same time, differences in educational attainment have become
the principal source of earnings inequality.  In simple terms, high earnings inequality is to a
large extent  a  cost  of the revaluation of human capital that has  taken place during the
transition in CE.
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This paper documents  trends in earnings  distribution during the transition in
Central Europe.  and examines  changes  in relative  wages  that have  underlined
the rise in earnings  inequality.  The paper  finds that the widening of earnings
distribution was concentrated  in the early phase  of transition, and the trend
towards  greater  inequality in most  countries  tapered  off during the late 1  990s.
This suggests  that a new equilibrium has  been  reached,  or at least  approached.
This  equilibrium is  characterized  by high but not exorbitant  earnings  dispersion.
In most  transitional economies  of Central  Europe  earnings  inequality is in the
upper part of the OECD range,  rarely beyond  that range.  The  widening of
earnings  distribution has  occurred  at its both ends.  The  relative  position of low-
paid workers  has  deteriorated  while the position of top paid workers  has
improved. At the same  time the incidence of both low- and high-pay has
considerably  increased.  High earnings  dispersion is particularly pronounced
in the private sector,  which is a primarv source  of both low- and high-paying
jobs. The  main observable  factcr behind the increase  in earnings  inequality
during the transition has  been the increase  in the premium to university
education. Education  is  currentlv  the single  most  important  variable  explaining
the attained level of inequality,  whereas inter-industry  wage  differentials are
seconcd  in importance.  The contribution of other factors,  such as  gender,  labor
)  market  experience,  location, is small or insignificant.
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